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SUMMARY
This monograph explores the emerging challenge
of nonstate actors’ anti-access and area denial (A2/
AD) strategies and their implications for the United
States and its allies. This monograph starts from one
major development: the historical monopoly of states
over precision-guided munitions has eroded, and this
evolution eventually challenges the ability of the most
advanced militaries to operate in certain environments.
Questioning the type of strategy that nonstate
actors may implement as they gain greater access to
advanced military technology, the research argues
some of these groups increasingly lean toward A2/
AD strategies. The analysis focuses on two regions, the
Middle East and Eastern Europe, where case studies
include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza
Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and separatist groups
in Ukraine. Three key parameters are underlined to
assess emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies: a political
shift toward the preservation of the status quo vis-àvis opponents, a significant focus of military resources
dedicated to A2/AD capabilities—primarily missiles
and rockets, and finally, a consequential adaptation of
the military units responsible for the implementation
of this new strategy.
These postures are still in their infancy and
should not be equated to those of major regional or
world powers, such as Iran, Russia, or China. The
development of nonstate A2/AD postures currently
remains dependent on the ability of the nonstate
actors to attract state sponsorship: Hezbollah was
able to acquire its arsenal because of its support
from Iran and Syria; the Houthis could not sustain
their ongoing missile campaign against Saudi Arabia
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without significant help from Tehran; and, likewise,
the Ukrainian separatists only became a credible threat
to Kiev thanks to the provision of military resources
by Russia. Thus, without state sponsorship, these
emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies would hardly
constitute a major threat.
Bearing in mind this precondition, if a scenario
of multiple nonstate A2/AD “bubbles” were to
unfold, the United States and its allies could face
unprecedented challenges, especially in the field of
counterterrorism campaigns. For military planners
considering scenarios in Europe and the Middle East,
the new constraints would need to be factored in when
assessing the option of using military force in regional
interventions. In addition, this type of conflict would
potentially raise the level of casualties and constitute
a kind of life insurance for the terrorist organizations.
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NONSTATE ACTORS AND ANTI-ACCESS/
AREA DENIAL STRATEGIES: THE COMING
CHALLENGE
INTRODUCTION
On July 14, 2006, the third day of the Second
Lebanon War, the Israeli corvette INS Hanit was
patrolling Lebanese waters approximately 10 nautical
miles off the coast of Beirut when it was suddenly
hit by a C-802 anti-ship missile. Four soldiers were
killed and the boat almost sank. Fired by Hezbollah,
the missile had been supplied by Iran. After the
conflict, government investigations in Israel revealed
significant mistakes. Specifically, intelligence agencies
had no information about an Iranian transfer of
an anti-ship missile to Hezbollah. Although some
military planners in Tel Aviv had warned such a
scenario would call for an appropriate response from
the Israeli Navy to protect its forces, the information
failed to translate into operational orders at the level
of the ship’s commander.1
This almost-forgotten event of the 2006 conflict
was a revealing episode of how modern armed forces
urgently need to revise their assumptions about the
sophistication of weaponry controlled by militias and
terrorist organizations. For the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF), this painful wake-up call illustrated the new
vulnerabilities the proliferation of missiles and rockets
had engendered. More broadly, the case of Hezbollah’s
anti-ship missile was a signal: the historical monopoly
of states—primarily, the United States and its allies—
over precision-guided munitions was eroding, and
1. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “How the Navy Missed
Its Boat,” Haaretz, January 18, 2008.
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this evolution would eventually challenge the ability
of the most advanced militaries to operate in certain
environments.2
This monograph explores the strategic significance
of this phenomenon. Specifically, it questions the type
of strategy that nonstate actors may implement as they
gain greater access to advanced military technology.
In that context, it argues some of these groups
increasingly lean toward anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD) strategies.
In some ways, this trend could be seen as a logical
evolution; as armed groups acquire technologies
previously controlled by states, they may also be
tempted to emulate state strategies specifically
designed to overcome a conventional inferiority. As
a result, the following pages look at this emerging
challenge of nonstate actors’ A2/AD strategies
and their implications for Western armed forces.
Specifically, this monograph looks at how this threat
is growing in the Middle East and Eastern European
theaters. In both areas, this monograph looks at
the capabilities and the ambition of groups such as
Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and
Ukrainian separatists to emulate traditional A2/AD
postures.
The assessment emphasizes throughout that
nonstate actors’ A2/AD strategies eventually involve
significant help from state patronage (in the cases
mentioned, either Iran or Russia). Until recently,
only states purchased these capabilities because of
their cost and the level of training their use required,
which is why scholarship on A2/AD strategies has
2. Andrew Krepinevich, Maritime Competition in a Mature
Precision-Strike Regime (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2014).
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mostly covered the policies of states such as Russia,
China, or Iran.3 But this monograph demonstrates
that some elements of the military strategy of these
nonstate actors resonate with those A2/AD postures.
The underlying assumption here is that this emerging
trend—these nascent strategies—could consolidate
and become a major challenge.
To support this argument, this monograph first
provides an analytical framework by putting the issue
into perspective with regard to the basic principles
of A2/AD strategies and the evolution of nonstate
warfare. We identify and specify three key parameters
to assess emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies: the
adoption of a status quo political agenda, the presence
of sufficient military capabilities to deny access to a
state opponent, and a military strategy that evidences
institutional adaptation to this new posture. We then
look at the first case, the Lebanese Hezbollah. Emerging
in the middle of the Lebanese Civil War around 1983,
the group has grown to become the most powerful
nonstate actor in the region in terms of military
capabilities and political influence. The evolution of
Hezbollah’s military strategy is intrinsically linked to
the history of the Iranian regional strategy—or, more
specifically, the strategy of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps. As we explore in the following pages, the
evolution of Hezbollah’s military strategy evidences
3. See Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair, Chinese
Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Stephan Frühling
and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad
Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (April–May 2016): 95–116; Mark
Gunzinger, Outside-In: Defeating Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial
Threat (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2012); and Shahryar Pasandideh, “Iran Boosts Its
A2AD Capabilities,” Diplomat, May 23, 2014.
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clear Iranian influences in the field of A2/AD. Rockets
and missiles have become a major component of
Hezbollah’s military posture. The third section looks
at other cases in the Middle East where the Hezbollah
experience could be a source of inspiration for other
armed groups—in particular, Hamas in the Gaza
Strip and the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. The fourth
section broadens the geographical scope of our case
studies by looking at the separatist movements in
Ukraine and by underlining the similar patterns at
play in these regions. Finally, the fifth section draws
major lessons learned regarding how these emerging
trends could alter the regional security landscapes
and eventually challenge the defense policies of the
United States and its allies by constraining their future
options for military intervention.
NONSTATE A2/AD STRATEGIES: DEFINING
THE ISSUE
This monograph endeavors to bring to light the
emerging phenomenon of A2/AD strategies being
implemented by nonstate actors. To that aim, the
argument connects two topics—A2/AD strategies
and nonstate actors—that may at first sight seem
unconnected. In the strategic literature, both issues
are usually discussed in separate chapters. In the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, for instance, the
authors clearly distinguish between the two ends of
the spectrum of conflict: on the lower end is “hybrid
contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric
approaches” and on the higher end is “conflict
against a state power armed with [weapons of mass
destruction] or technologically advanced anti-access
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and area-denial capabilities.”4 In other words, A2/AD
scenarios would only involve states, and conversely,
nonstate actors would rely on less ambitious strategies.
In this perspective, one needs to first define
the relationship between the two elements of our
proposition and identify how their combination
is altering the strategic environment. The most
appropriate starting point is the definition of A2/AD
strategies: “Those actions and capabilities, usually
long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force
from entering an operational area. Area denial refers
to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter
range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but
to limit its freedom of action within the operational
area.”5 Released in the wake of the discussion on
the American need to address the challenges posed
by the maritime strategies of states like China in the
South China Sea and Iran in the Persian Gulf, the
document aimed to provide guidance for the military
services. But the topic of A2/AD itself is much older: it
emerged in the American strategic debate in the early
nineties and was, to a certain extent, a by-product
of the discussion on the emerging revolution in
military affairs initiated within Andrew Marshall’s
Office of Net Assessment within the US Department
of Defense.6 In 1993, Andrew Krepinevich—then a
lieutenant colonel assigned to Marshall’s office—wrote
4. US Department of Defense (DoD), Quadrennial Defense
Review (Washington, DC: DoD, 2014), VII, http://archive.defense
.gov/home/features/2014/0314_sdr/qdr.aspx.
5. DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington,
DC: DoD, January 17, 2012), i, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1
/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.
6. Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last Warrior:
Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense
Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015).
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in a policy brief that “as peer competitors [states with
military potential comparable to that of the United
States] become increasingly proficient in exploiting
advanced technologies . . . and as many Third World
states acquire more destructive, extended-range
weaponry, the conduct of forcible-entry operations
will change dramatically.”7
In essence, A2/AD defensive strategies aimed to
protect one actor’s control over a territory were to be
based on the combination of a wide array of weaponry,
such as precision-guided missiles, anti-ship and antiair defense systems, and armed drones. Because of
the level of sophistication these military technologies
required, only states were assumed to be able to build
such A2/AD postures. China was the primary object
of US speculation since the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1991. But soon other countries were included on
the list: Russia was believed to be building A2/AD
strategies in Eastern Europe, particularly around the
country’s Kaliningrad oblast, and Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards engaged in similar activities in the Persian
Gulf.
Which signals could warn us about the
development of such military postures? In his book
Anti-Access Warfare, Sam Tangredi designates five
indicators to explain the inclination of a state toward
A2/AD strategies: (1) the perception of conventional
inferiority vis-à-vis a potential aggressor, (2) the use
of geography as an element to facilitate the attrition
of the opponent, (3) the primacy of the maritime
domain—which, in Tangredi’s view, includes both the
maritime and the air and space components, (4) the
centrality of information and intelligence to support
7. Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), 8.
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the posture, and (5) the objective of the strategy, which
is to neutralize the enemy—not destroy it—until it
gets too exhausted and loses its determination.8
Historians of strategy may argue A2/AD is merely
a buzzword and the principles behind it are nothing
new. The concept relies on the idea of building
defensive measures not to defeat an enemy—whose
superiority is acknowledged—but simply to convince
the latter that the cost of an invasion, at the human
and technological levels, would be so prohibitive
that the invasion would not be a conceivable option
in the first place.9 Simply put, A2/AD strategies work
to deter a conventional attack, but the real innovation
today is the combination of this old principle with
a high degree of technological sophistication. The
growth in the use of precision-guided munitions and
long-range weapons and their exponential acquisition
by countries that are not the most technologically
advanced have had a dramatic impact on US national
security: it accelerated the ability of these states to
challenge America’s traditional military superiority
by maximizing the potential damage inflicted on
intervening forces. Applied effectively, the strategy
could prevent an external intervention in a specific
area—hence, the term “A2/AD bubbles.” But if
the strategic literature has mostly discussed how
states have been implementing this strategy, we are
currently witnessing a new phase of development.
The increasing ability of nonstate actors to emulate
8. Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare. Countering A2/AD
Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
9. For a critical look at the A2/AD debate in the Chinese
context, see Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in
the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, US AirSea
Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International
Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48.

7

this posture results from two parameters. First, the
modern dissemination of military or dual technologies
outside the sphere of state-controlled entities is
impacting the distribution of power; criminal
organizations or terrorist groups can use smartphones,
3D printing, robotic and autonomous systems, as
well as indigenously-made rockets. For instance, it
is estimated that a short-range Qassam rocket such
as those Hamas controls in the Gaza Strip costs
approximately $1,000.10 As a result, the progress made
in rocket and missile technology (accuracy, throw
weight, and penetration aids) acquired by extremist
groups changes the way they can use, or threaten to
use, violence on the battlefield.
Thus, technological progress relates more broadly
to the implications of the growth of precision-guided
munitions, as described by strategists since the early
1990s. Thomas Mahnken wrote the following:
Wars in a mature precision-strike regime will likely
focus on coercion and limited political objectives. In this
world, the ability to punish an adversary to force him to
concede—what Thomas Schelling dubbed the “power to
hurt”—is likely to become an increasingly popular theory
of victory. One potential result of this strategic interaction
would be conflicts that involve campaigns whereby each
side uses precision-strike weapons to hold the other’s
economic and industrial infrastructure at risk. In such a
situation, stability would depend on each side possessing
an assured survivable retaliatory capability.11

10. Uzi Rubin, The Missile Threat from Gaza: From Nuisance
to Strategic Threat (Tel Aviv: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies, 2011), 15.
11. See the analysis of Thomas Mahnken, “Weapons: The
Growth and Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus 140,
no. 3 (Summer 2011): 53.
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Mahnken’s reasoning applied to strategies among
states. But the pace of this technological revolution
and the diffusion of military power it engenders are
such that the demarcation between states and nonstate
actors in this domain is being eroded.
This change, however, is not simply a matter of
technology. The proliferation of rockets and missiles
eventually becomes a game changer if these new
capabilities are integrated into a cohesive military
organization that carries out a coherent strategy. One
should not underestimate the level of knowledge and
training required at the individual and collective level
with regard to the efficient use of rockets and missiles.
Scholarship in the field has emphasized the importance
of not looking only at capabilities as an indicator of
military power.12 In his book Military Power: Explaining
Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Stephen Biddle uses
the variable of force employment—understood as “the
doctrine and tactics by which armies use their materiel
in the field”—to explain whether armed forces will be
effective in battle.13 In Biddle’s view, the way militaries
use their resources is as important as the resources
themselves. Likewise, in The Diffusion of Military
Power, Michael Horowitz argues military innovation
succeeds when the actor invests significant efforts
12. For more on the early debate on the revolution in military
affairs, see William Odom, America’s Military Revolution: Strategy
and Structure After the Cold War (Washington, DC: American
University Press, 1993); Michael Mazarr, The Military-Technical
Revolution: A Structural Framework (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 1993); Earl Tilford, The
Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1995); and Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution
in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March–April 1996): 37–54.
13. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and
Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006), 2.
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in terms of financial resources and organizational
changes to adopt the new technology fully: “It is the
employment of technologies by organizations, rather
than the technologies themselves, that most often
makes the difference.”14
Obviously small entities such as extremist
groups may face lesser challenges than the huge
bureaucracies needed by national armed forces
to implement organizational changes. Smaller
entities are less constrained by competing chains of
command, bureaucratic battles, or political oversight
that typically hinder the implementation of a reform
in modern militaries.15 This organization means the
contemporary tendency of nonstate groups to adopt
A2/AD postures cannot be solely understood by their
access to the most advanced technologies; rather, it is
understood by the combination of this access with an
internal reformation of the group’s military structure
and a new political agenda. A classic counterargument
could indeed be that terrorist organizations obtaining
weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles are
likely to use them because their objective by design is
to terrorize, not deter, which is why A2/AD postures
will become attractive to these groups if they are
combined with a shift in their political agendas. As
explained earlier, the logic behind a credible A2/
AD strategy requires a proponent that is rational
and who can effectively convey the message that an
attack on its area of influence will lead to major losses
for the offender. By extension, this posture implies
14. Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes
and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2010), 2.
15. John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: How Masters
of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
2011).
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the nonstate actor does not try to change the current
status quo. It suggests only those violent groups that
abandon a revolutionary platform and instead accept
the existing state of affairs as a tacit agreement will
favor an A2/AD strategy.16
The embrace of this status quo is likely to occur
when a group exercises its power in a specific
area, both militarily as well as politically, socially,
and economically. Usually, factions aiming for the
status quo will try as much as possible not to lose
their command over this territory. Defending the
conditions on the ground enables them to protect
themselves against external adversaries as well as
internal competitors. Overall, for the nonstate actors
operating as quasi-states, these territorial gains
become vulnerabilities that need to be protected.17
Against this backdrop, this monograph posits
that three parameters need to be met to signal
the emergence of a nonstate A2/AD posture: the
combination of a robust arsenal of sophisticated
weapons, a political agenda accepting the status quo,
and a revised military strategy that will favor the
adoption of a nonstate A2/AD strategy.
1. A credible military strength. A2/AD postures
rely on sophisticated capabilities on which states
have the monopoly for the most part. Therefore,
only a limited number of nonstate groups can
access these technologies. As of today, the
main, if not unique, component of nonstate
A2/AD postures is artillery—specifically, the
16. On the notion of tacit agreement in conflict, see Thomas
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1960).
17. John Lea and Kevin Stenson, “Security, Sovereignty, and
Non-State Governance ‘From Below,’” Canadian Journal of Law &
Society 22, no. 2 (2007): 9–27.
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acquisition of missiles and rockets that will
enable their owner to challenge the conventional
superiority of its opponent. Because these
resources are demanding in terms of both cost
and manpower (requiring significant training
for engineers and operators), groups that
allocate their efforts toward these investments
will progressively abandon—or decrease their
reliance on—traditional terrorist tactics, such as
suicide attacks and car bombings.
2. A political preference for status quo. Violent
extremist groups are more likely to build an
A2/AD posture if their political agenda moves
away from a revolutionary model—whether
driven by religion or ideology—and leans
toward a status quo position. At the rhetorical
level, actors may not explicitly reject all
revolutionary aspirations. But a shift in terms of
priorities should occur as the leadership of the
group expresses the decision not to transform
its security environment in an effort to preserve
its presence in and its influence within the
environment.
3. A revised military strategy. The combination
of a shifting political agenda and sufficient
military strength should translate at the strategic
level into a new way of using force. Because
the group becomes a status quo player, it will
likely refocus its efforts on defense rather than
offense, which does not exclude the potential
for occasional aggression such as hit-and-run
attacks. Overall, military operations are no
longer about changing a situation; rather, they
are about maintaining the current balance of
power. It could be argued that by doing so,

12

the nonstate group shifts its strategy from
compellence, supported by the terrorist tactic
of constant harassment, to limited deterrence,
relying on arsenals able to reach the territory or
troops of the enemy.18
In the following pages, this analytical framework
will enable us to better apprehend the emerging
trends in nonstate military strategies. From this
perspective, the monograph looks at two regions of
the world where nascent nonstate A2/AD strategies
can be identified: the Middle East and Eastern
Europe—specifically, Ukraine. In both cases, we can
observe the ability of militias or separatist movements
to defy modern states and to impose, to a certain
extent, their conditions, forcing the other side to halt
its intervention or concede the status quo. In the Arab
world, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi insurgency
have been able to circumvent their fundamental
inferiority vis-à-vis stronger states, such as Israel
or Saudi Arabia. The nonstate actors have used
their arsenals to constrain the ability of the states to
intervene in their strongholds. Similarly, Ukrainian
separatists have developed a strategy that, in practice,
aims to freeze indefinitely the conflict by preventing
the regular forces commanded by the authorities in
18. We use the concepts of compellence and deterrence here
as being both types of coercion, according to Thomas Schelling’s
definition in Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New York:
Praeger, 1977). “Compellence” is understood as threatening
an adversary to change his behavior vis-à-vis the conflict, and
“deterrence” is a threat intended to keep the adversary from
changing his position. In his seminal book, Schelling underlines
the “difference between inducting inaction [deterrence] and
making someone perform [compellence].”
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Kiev to retake control of the disputed territories in the
east of the country.
HEZBOLLAH: A MODEL OF NONSTATE A2/AD
POSTURE
Hezbollah, which was famously characterized by
former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
as the “A-Team of Terrorists,” has for a long time
been depicted as one of the most emblematic
terrorist groups in the Middle East.19 But this popular
perception does not grasp the multifaceted reality
of Hezbollah as it stands today or, more specifically,
how it has evolved since the mid-1990s. Hezbollah—
literally the “Party of God”—emerged in 1983 in the
middle of the Lebanese Civil War. It was born from
a combination of two factors: the growing discontent
of the local Shia community feeling disenfranchised
by the government in Beirut and suffering Israel’s
invasion of the country and the Iranian strategy of
spreading its model to the Middle East by supporting
a proxy.20 The group achieved notoriety by kidnapping
Western hostages and by bombing the US embassy
and the US and French military barracks in Beirut. For
the first decade of its existence, Hezbollah behaved
as a typical terrorist organization and promoted a
revolutionary agenda: the establishment of an Iranlike Islamic regime in Lebanon and the destruction
of Israel, which the group described as the “Zionist
entity.” But the organization underwent a major
revision in the early 1990s as Lebanon ended the civil
19. Quoted in Rebecca Leung, “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team of
Terrorists,’” CBS News, April 18, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/hezbollah-a-team-of-terrorists/.
20. Augustus Norton, Hezbollah. A Short History (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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war and a new political life emerged in Beirut. It is this
reorganization we will now examine using our three
parameters.
First, at the political level, the shift emerged in
1992 under the leadership of Hezbollah’s newly
appointed secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. Under
his leadership, Hezbollah started an internal process
of “Lebanonization.” In practice, the group adhered
to the principles of the Lebanese political system and
participated in national and local elections. The party
no longer advocated for the import of an Islamic
regime into the country. It embraced the balance of
power among the various Lebanese sects. Hezbollah
became so effective at this game that it became a full
player in Lebanese politics—arguably, the strongest
one today—and joined blocs and alliances.21 As
an illustration of this new reality, the group was
instrumental in the election of Michel Aoun in 2016 as
president of Lebanon.22
Alongside this process, the group consolidated its
grip over vast parts of Lebanon, from the southern
region to the Bekaa Valley. This consolidation implied
both a strong military footprint and a significant
involvement in the local economy, which eventually
led Hezbollah to become an agent of the status quo
within the Lebanese political system. References
to the Iranian political system have become part of
Hezbollah’s folklore, but no more than that.23 At the
21. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of
Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005).
22. Thanassis Cambanis, “Michel Aoun Rises to Lebanese
Presidency, Ending Power Vacuum,” New York Times, October 31,
2016.
23. Krista Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group:
Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009): 669–80.
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same time, Hezbollah has been working hard not to
let its opponents discuss or question its arsenal. Any
attempt by its political rivals to challenge Hezbollah’s
military and economic power was systematically
met with defiance and a strong show of force, as
demonstrated by the clash in western Beirut in May
2008.24
This political position was supplemented by the
spectacular development of Hezbollah’s military
power. The combination of indigenous, rudimentary
rockets and Iranian-made ballistic missiles has enabled
Hezbollah to build a military force to be reckoned
with in southern Lebanon. Eventually, this weapons
buildup allowed Hezbollah to deny Israel’s access to
the group’s controlled territories. As in other places,
Israel and its international allies have been unable
to prevent the steady growth of Hezbollah’s arsenal.
By the start of the Second Lebanon War, the group
had stored approximately 12,000 rockets, and Israeli
officials estimated that, by 2017, Hezbollah possessed
150,000 rockets.25 The exact size of this arsenal is
withheld by Hezbollah, which maintains a calculated
opacity. But the figures provide us with a fair idea of
the group’s change of scale over the last decade.
These weapons are not simply short-range
projectiles of limited accuracy. Hezbollah’s arsenal
also includes short- to medium-range ballistic missiles
provided by the Iranian and Syrian regimes. By 2010,
Western intelligence sources believed the Bashar
al-Assad regime had supplied the Lebanese group
24. Robert Worth and Nada Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath
of Beirut from US-Backed Lebanon Government,” New York Times,
May 10, 2008.
25. Avi Issacharoff, “Israel Raises Hezbollah Rocket Estimate
to 150,000,” Times of Israel, November 12, 2017.
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with M-600 short-range ballistic missiles, a variant of
the Fateh-110, able to carry a 1,100-pound warhead
with a range of 210 kilometers (km). It is estimated
the inertial guidance system of the M-600 allows the
missile to strike its target within 460 meters. That same
year, Syria reportedly transferred Scud-B ballistic
missiles to Hezbollah, triggering a statement from the
US Department of State: “The United States condemns
in the strongest terms the transfer of any arms, and
especially ballistic missile systems such as the Scud,
from Syria to Hezbollah. . . . The transfer of these arms
can only have a destabilizing effect on the region,
and would pose an immediate threat to both the
security of Israel and the sovereignty of Lebanon.”26
State patronage should not be underestimated;
Hezbollah’s inventory remains highly dependable on
its connections with Syria and Iran. Brigadier General
Yossi Baidatz, former intelligence research director for
the IDF, has underlined the nature of this triangular
relation: “Weapons are transferred to Hezbollah on
a regular basis and this transfer is organized by the
Syrian and Iranian regimes. Therefore, it should not be
called smuggling of arms to Lebanon—it is organized
and official transfer.”27
If the start of the Syrian Civil War in March 2011
led observers to wonder about the ability of Hezbollah
to sustain its arsenal without the gateway provided
by the Assad regime, in practice, the group did not
suffer from the conflict but actually grew bigger.28 In
26. Mark Landler, “US Speaks to Syrian Envoy of Arms
Worries,” New York Times, April 19, 2010.
27. Amnon Meranda, “Military Intelligence: Hezbollah Scuds
Tip of Iceberg,” Ynetnews.com, May 4, 2010, https://www.ynetnews
.com/articles/0,7340,L-3884753,00.html.
28. Jean-Loup Samaan, Hezbollah beyond the Syrian Conflict
(Abu Dhabi: Emirates Diplomatic Academy, February 2017).
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September 2018, the former deputy chief of Israel’s
Mossad, Naftali Granot, argued publicly that despite
frequent air raids on Syria, Israel had failed to prevent
significant transfers to Hezbollah. Granot went on
to say the group “recently received small numbers
of GPS precision-guided systems that will help it to
convert some heavy rockets into accurate missiles.”29
In fact, these latest developments have led observers
to speculate Hezbollah was trying to change the status
quo by creating new facts on the ground, whether
in terms of its missile inventory or its territorial
posture. Israeli forces have been very nervous about
Hezbollah’s and Iran’s activities inside Syria near the
Golan Heights. Over recent years, it has appeared both
actors have not been solely fighting Syrian rebels near
the armistice line of the Golan Heights, but rather,
turning this area into a new forward operating base
to target Israel. Various reports claim tunnels and
bunkers are being built to prepare for the next conflict
with the Israeli military.30
At the level of military organization and strategy,
Hezbollah has grown into an ambitious nonstate
actor that has mastered the use of rockets and ballistic
missiles to support its political goals. The first record
of Hezbollah firing rockets on Israel was in February
1992. Following the assassination by the IDF of Abbas
al-Musawi, the secretary general of Hezbollah, it
retaliated by launching rockets on Israel’s northern
cities. In the following years, this tit-for-tat tactic
became a pattern: Hezbollah would use its rockets
29. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Ex-Deputy Mossad Chief: IDF
Didn’t Fully Stop New Hezbollah Rocket Tech,” Jerusalem Post,
September 7, 2018.
30. Jean-Loup Samaan, “In Golan, a Battle Looms between
Iran and Israel,” National, October 26, 2015.
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to compel the IDF to withdraw its occupying forces
from southern Lebanon. The military structure of
Hezbollah adapted to this new technology. Artillery
units were reorganized and militants went through
intensive training.31 As this significantly changed the
effectiveness of the group on the battlefield, Israeli
governments launched three major operations (in
1993, 1996, and 2006) to destroy Hezbollah’s military
power. But their efforts did not succeed and only
resulted in temporary pauses.
At the historical level, it is important to distinguish
between Hezbollah’s missile strategy until the Israeli
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and
the missile strategy since that time. Between 1992
and 2000, Hezbollah used rockets as a means of
compellence to force Israel out of the occupied area of
Lebanon. Hassan Nasrallah made this logic of the use
of rockets clear in an interview given to the Lebanese
newspaper As-Safir on February 27, 1992: “We have
to work . . . toward creating a situation in which the
enemy is subject to our conditions. We should tell him:
‘If you attack us, we will use our Katyushas; if you do
not attack us, we will not use our Katyushas.’”32
The new logic was followed by a decreased
reliance on terrorist tactics in the area. This strategic
emphasis on rockets as means of compellence may
have been influenced by the Iranian military advisors
to Hezbollah and their own experience of missile
warfare during the Iran-Iraq War of the previous
decade. During that conflict, Iran suffered major losses
31. Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s
Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (New York: Random House,
2011), 33.
32. Hassan Nasrallah, Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, ed. Nicholas Noe (London: Verso, 2007),
62.
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in the War of the Cities when the Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein launched missiles on the major Iranian urban
centers to break the morale of the country. As a result,
the ballistic program of Tehran grew in earnest in the
1990s.33
Remarkably, as the political agenda of Hezbollah
evolved in Lebanon’s post-civil war period, so did
its military strategy. In 2000, the decision of Israel’s
Prime Minister Ehud Barak to remove Israeli forces
from Lebanon was in itself a major challenge for the
party that had defined itself according to the Israeli
occupation. It had to find a new raison d’être if it
wanted to avoid becoming “a rebel without a cause,”
to use an expression of an International Crisis Group
report at the time.34 If Hezbollah initially rejected the
new border circumscribed by UN Resolution 425 as the
“blue line,” it eventually respected the demarcation.
Because Hezbollah wanted to maintain its political
influence and military arsenal, it adopted a status quo
posture that militarily translated into a deterrence
strategy: the goal was no longer to push the IDF into
retreat but to threaten Israel with painful retaliation
if the IDF attacked Lebanon.35 This logic only grew
more extreme after the 2006 war; the feeling within
Hezbollah circles was its missile force had successfully
defied Israeli air power. In one major speech, Hassan
33. Kevin Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam’s Audio Files,
1978–2001: Toward an Understanding of Authoritarian Regimes
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010).
34. “Hizbollah: Rebel without a Cause?,” International
Crisis Group, July 30, 2003, https://www.crisisgroup.org
/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/lebanon
/hizbollah-rebel-without-cause.
35. Daniel Sobelman, New Rules of the Game: Israel and
Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies, January 2004).
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Nasrallah clarified the type of “force employment” he
now conceived with regard to missiles and rockets.
They think they can demolish Dahiya’s buildings as we
barely “puncture their walls.” But I tell them today: You
destroy a Dahiya building and we will destroy buildings
in Tel Aviv. . . . If you target Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport, we will strike Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport. If you target our electricity stations, we
will target yours. If you target our plants, we will target
yours.36

In another speech in 2010, Nasrallah repeated
this reasoning: “If you blockade our coastline, shores
and ports, all military and commercial ships heading
toward Palestine throughout the Mediterranean
Sea will be targeted by the rockets of the Islamic
Resistance.”37
Deterrence is by design a strategy that enforces
the status quo. Moreover, it could be added that
this deterrence calculus vis-à-vis Israel reads as a
convenient way for Hezbollah to sell the rationale for
maintaining its hold on its arsenal and avoiding any
disarmament inside Lebanon.
All in all, Hezbollah’s military strategy has
matured. It now reflects a shift from past revolutionary
aspirations to a focus on maintaining the current status
quo—both vis-à-vis the Lebanese polity and the Israeli
armed forces. Hezbollah’s strategy also evidences
an effective adaptation of its apparatus to the new
firepower obtained with its missile inventories. This
36. Hassan Nasrallah, Khitaab al radaa’ (Beirut: Al-Manar,
2010), DVD.
37. Nicholas Blanford and Bilal Saab, The Next War: How
another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both
Sides are Preparing for It (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
2011), 10.
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adaptation is visible in the speeches of Hezbollah’s
leader Hassan Nasrallah, considered as a kind of
declaratory policy, as well as in the training and
force posture of Hezbollah combatants. As a result,
it significantly constrains Israeli decisionmakers
contemplating future interventions similar to the
campaign of 2006. Planners of an Israeli campaign
over Lebanon now have to factor in the firepower
of Hezbollah and the level of damage it could cause
for the IDF as well as the Israeli population. In other
words, Hezbollah has turned southern Lebanon into a
quasi-A2/AD bubble.
As of today, the Hezbollah experience might be the
closest case to an emerging nonstate A2/AD strategy.
Still, the transfer of new precision-guided munitions
from Syria and the buildup of military positions near
the Golan Heights may indicate Hezbollah is not
entirely relying on a logic of maintaining the status
quo, and is perhaps trying to establish new facts on the
ground, even if that means risking an Israeli retaliation.
But notwithstanding this issue, the ability of the group
to significantly coerce Israel is one of the reasons why
the group has become a reference for most of the other
insurgents and terrorist organizations in the Middle
East looking to turn their conquests into defensible
gains. The next section looks at some other cases.
RISING NONSTATE A2/AD STRATEGIES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
Numerous nonstate actors have been tempted to
emulate the Hezbollah model, but only a few have been
able to reach a sufficient level of internal development
as defined by our three parameters of political agenda,
military strength, and military strategy. This section
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aims to identify those groups that have embarked on
a process of political-military reforms that could lead
them to morph into a Hezbollah-like organization. It
looks at two different cases: Hamas in the Gaza Strip
and the Houthis in Yemen.38 Although each is in a
different phase of its development, both have grown
into major nonstate organizations challenging modern
armed forces.
Hamas was the first group that followed
Hezbollah’s path. Founded in 1987 as an offshoot of
the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories,
Hamas—which stands for Harakat al Muqawama
al Islamiya, or the “Movement of the Islamic
Resistance”—was initially operating as a terrorist
group that employed suicide attacks as its primary
tactic.39 Condemning the Oslo Accords of 1993, Hamas
progressively outflanked Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian
Authority by becoming the vanguard of “resistance
and revolution” against Israel, in particular during
the second Intifada in the first part of the 2000s. In
the aftermath of the second intifada, the leadership
of the Palestinian Authority was seriously questioned
in the light of numerous corruption cases and its
inability to reach a deal with Israel that would benefit
the Palestinian population. As a result, Hamas won
the legislative election of 2006, leading to a major
inter-Palestinian crisis: the Palestine Liberation
Organization removed Hamas from the West Bank
and Hamas responded by returning the favor in the
38. For a detailed comparison between Hezbollah and
Hamas, see Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas:
A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2012).
39. Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010).
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Gaza Strip. Since then, Hamas has been the de facto
ruling party in Gaza.
The transition of Hamas from revolutionary
rhetoric to a status quo position has been rather similar
to Hezbollah’s. Following the Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza in 2005, Hamas focused on building its control
over the territory by establishing its own government
structures and controlling the economy, the health
system, and the media networks.40 As Hamas
became the main political force in Gaza, it implicitly
recognized the existence of Israel by accepting a state
of deterrence similar to—but more fragile than—the
one already prevailing with Hezbollah.
At the military level, Hamas began acquiring
a vast amount of Qassam rockets. Its first use of a
Qassam rocket in Gaza is said to have occurred in
2001 during the second intifada.41 There exists today
four models of these rockets: the Qassam I ranges 3
km and consequently can only reach urban places like
Sderot, the western Negev city. The Qassam II, with a
range of up to 7 km, can only modestly go beyond the
first model. The Qassam III, with a maximum range
of 10 km, puts Ashkelon in its reach. And, finally, the
Qassam IV has a range of 15 km.
Hamas also benefited from Iran’s support, though
it remained more limited than in the case of Hezbollah.
In 2012, Israeli media reported the Palestinian group
had fired the Iran-made Fajr-5 rocket. With its 75-km
range, the Fajr-5 was a significant breakthrough
for Hamas that enabled it to aim deeper into Israeli
territory. In total, Hamas is said to have accumulated
approximately 10,000 rockets inside Gaza—a slightly
40. Bjorn Brenner, Gaza under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy
to Islamist Governance (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017).
41. Rubin, Missile Threat.
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lower number than Hezbollah’s inventory before the
2006 war.42
At the level of strategic adaptation, Hamas has
not advanced as far as Hezbollah in terms of military
professionalization. Hamas remains at a crossroads:
there are indications that, like Hezbollah, it favors
a status quo position to secure its grip on Gaza—
especially vis-à-vis other competing Palestinian
groups—but it has not yet fully abandoned its past
terrorist tactics. On the one hand, Hamas has made
rockets the cornerstone of its military strategy, as
evidenced by the lessons from Israeli Operation Pillar
of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge
(2014).43 The psychological effect achieved by rocket
warfare and the inability of the IDF in both campaigns
to decisively degrade the arsenal only reinforced
Hamas’s reliance on them.44 More and more, its leaders
have used the image of rockets in their speeches in
the same way Hezbollah did. When Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon decided to withdraw the IDF from the
Gaza Strip in 2005, the leader of Hamas and disputed
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had already declared,
“Sharon cannot evade the truth. The Qassam [rocket]
is what forced the enemy out.”45
42. “IDF Official: Hamas Has Replenished Its Missile
Capability since 2014 War,” Jerusalem Post, January 31, 2017,
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-ConflictIDF-official-Hamas-has
-replenished-its-missile-capability-since-2014-war-480175.
43. Raphael Cohen et al., From Cast Lead to Protective Edge:
Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2017).
44. Yiftah S. Shapir, “Rocket Warfare in Operation Protective
Edge,” in The Lessons of Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo
Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security, 2014).
45. Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of
Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
177.
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In terms of military structure, the artillery forces
of Hamas’s military wing have been the primary
component of the movement since the second half
of the 2000s. It has also been argued that operational
orders such as the firing of a rocket are not taken at the
level of battlefield command, but at a higher political
level to ensure cohesion between military tactics
and political objectives. Like Hezbollah, Hamas has
invested in indigenous capabilities; by the end of the
2000s, it had built a rocket research and development
center at the Islamic University of Gaza that directly
supported the production of Qassam rockets.46
At the same time, Hamas has maintained
ambiguity regarding some of its past revolutionary
rhetoric. In 2017, the group revised its founding
charter to soften its criticism of Israel. Specifically,
it recognized the principle of a Palestinian state that
would be established within the borders created
by the 1967 Third Arab-Israeli War. But it refrained
from recognizing the existence of Israel: “Hamas
considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and
independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its
capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967 . . . to be a
formula of national consensus.” It also declares, “The
establishment of the Zionist entity therein . . . [does]
not annul the right of the Palestinian people to their
entire land” and “there shall be no recognition of the
legitimacy of the Zionist entity.”47
46. Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, Hamas in Combat: The
Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement
(Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
October 2009).
47.
“A
Document
of
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and
Policies,” Hamas, May 1, 2017, http://hamas.ps/en/post
/678/a-document-of-general-principles-and-policies.

26

Likewise, the group did not fully abandon terrorist
tactics. Starting in 2015, Hamas’s propaganda machine
renewed its call for a new wave of suicide attacks
against Israel.48 In April 2016, a Palestinian bomber
targeting a bus in Jerusalem was identified by Israeli
security services as a member of Hamas.49 Among
other cases, in October 2018, Israel’s Shin Bet, the
internal security agency, declared it had prevented
multiple terrorist attacks planned by Hamas from
the Gaza Strip.50 As a result, the Israeli authorities
have alerted their Western partners about the risk of
misreading the evolution of Hamas. From a strategic
point of view, this resurgence of terrorist tactics
demonstrates an inability or unwillingness, as of yet,
of the organization to transform itself into a status
quo actor, as Hezbollah did. This approach has less
to do with the military capabilities of the group than
its political agenda. And the subsequent choice made
for its prevailing military strategy might evolve in
the near future, depending on Hamas’s power plays
within the Palestinian political arena vis-à-vis Fatah,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Salafi groups
operating in Gaza.
A second group that might contemplate the
Hezbollah model is the Houthi rebellion—otherwise
known as Ansar Allah—in Yemen. Although the
group is frequently depicted as the Yemeni version
of Hezbollah, this analogy hides the complexities of
48. “Hamas Call for Suicide Bombings in Israeli Buses,” Times
of Israel, February 7, 2016.
49. “Israel Says Jerusalem Bus Bombing Was Hamas Suicide
Attack,” BBC News, April 21, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news
/world-middle-east-36100485.
50. Anna Ahronheim, “Shin Bet Thwarts Planned Hamas
Terror Attacks against Israeli Targets,” Jerusalem Post, October 3,
2018.
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the group’s local trajectory. The movement grew in
earnest in 2004 as a Zaidi cleric, Hussein Badr Eddin
al Houthi, called for a rebellion against the regime
of Ali Abdullah Saleh in the northern province of
Sa’da.51 The upheaval built on the resentment of the
Zaidi community—one of the branches of Shia Islam
considered the closest to the Sunni tradition—toward
the inability of the government in Sanaa to deliver on
social and economic development. A first war erupted
by the summer of 2004. Following the killing of
Hussein Badr Eddin al Houthi later that same year, his
father and brother assumed leadership and ramped
up the confrontational rhetoric against the regime.
In total, six wars between the Houthi forces and the
government occurred between 2004 and 2010.
A year later, Saleh was overthrown by a popular
revolt in the midst of the Arab Spring. As Saleh left
the country, he was replaced by his vice president
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Hadi was elected
president during the elections of 2012. His transitional
government proved unable to establish a semblance
of authority in the country, and by September 2014,
the Houthis launched a new offensive that enabled
them to quickly seize the capital Sanaa and expand
their territory. In March 2015, the Battle of Aden saw
the Houthis fighting in an odd coalition alongside the
army units loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh against the
forces of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. By the end of the
month, the Houthi-Saleh coalition had taken control
of Aden, and Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. This event
triggered the decision in Riyadh to launch the buildup
of a Saudi-led coalition to intervene in Yemen.
51. Uzi Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 154.
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In the years since the Yemeni conflict started in
2015, Houthi conduct has been influenced by the
Hezbollah experience in many ways. Both the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah fighters have
provided military support to the Houthi insurgents.
Hezbollah’s presence in the country started before the
war, as military operatives such as Khalil Harb and
Abu Ali Tabatabai had been reportedly traveling there
in previous years.52
As the war against the Saudi-led coalition
escalated, the Hezbollah model became an inspiration
for the Houthis in two fields: guerrilla and missile
warfare. More specifically, starting in 2016, the conflict
turned into a kind of war of attrition that led to an
intensification in the frequency and range of missiles
being fired by the Houthis, either on Saudi territory
or on ships crossing the Red Sea. Noticeably, in
October 2016, the Houthis used an anti-ship missile
in the Red Sea that struck a United Arab Emirates
(UAE) vessel. The missile was later assessed by
experts to be a Chinese-made C-802, the same type
Hezbollah used against the Israeli Navy during the
2006 conflict.53 Although it was undoubtedly delivered
by Iran, Hezbollah may have played a role as trainer.54
Some sources even go as far as to suggest Hezbollah
combatants may have been the ones launching the
missiles.55 Likewise, a widely circulated video in the
spring of 2016 showed Hezbollah commander Abu
52. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Pivot toward the Gulf,”
CTC Sentinel, August 22, 2016.
53. Jeremy Binnie, “UAE’s Swift Hit by Anti-Ship Missile,”
IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 4, 2016.
54. Former US government analyst, interview by the author,
December 2016.
55. Alexander Corbeil and Amarnah Amarsingam, “The
Houthi Hezbollah,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2016.
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Saleh meeting with Houthi fighters and discussing the
planning of operations inside Saudi Arabia.56
In the following months, Saudi Arabia became a
frequent target of the Houthis’ missiles. In October
2016, the King Abdul Aziz International Airport in
Jeddah was attacked. In November 2017, the capital,
Riyadh, was hit by a Burkan-2H missile that traveled
about 900 km.
The other contributor to the Saudi-led coalition, the
UAE, has also been the target of failed attempts by the
Houthis to launch missiles on its territory. In December
2017, the Houthis declared they had launched a cruise
missile on the Barakah nuclear reactor in the emirate
of Abu Dhabi. No signs of destruction were reported,
and Emirati authorities denied the claim. Similarly,
the Houthis reported in August 2018 they had
targeted Dubai International Airport with a drone but
were unable to provide any evidence.57 These failed
attempts obviously call for a cautious assessment on
the real capacities of the group.
As in the case of Hezbollah, the ability of the
Houthis to use their arsenal was made possible thanks
to state support, namely from Iran. Prior to the conflict,
Yemen had not been known to build its own ballistic
missiles. Saleh’s regime had stored some Scud-B
missiles and Hwasong-6 missiles, but the images of
the missiles fired at Saudi Arabia suggested at least
some of them were of Iranian origin.58 Furthermore,
a few days after the presumed attack on the UAE in
56. Corbeil and Amarsingam, “Houthi Hezbollah.”
57. “UAE Denies Report of Houthi Drone Attack on Dubai
Airport,” Reuters, August 27, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-emirates-security/uae-denies-report-of-houthi-drone-attack-on
-dubai-airport-idUSKCN1LC1YQ.
58. IHS Markit, “Yemeni Rebels Enhance Ballistic Missile
Campaign,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 7, 2017.
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December 2017, the US ambassador to the United
Nations, Nikki Haley, issued a strong statement
accusing Iran of transferring these weapons to the
rebels in Yemen.59 Several public assessments from
US intelligence agencies subsequently supported this
claim.60 In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on
Yemen wrote in its report that Iran had “failed to
take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or
indirect supply, sale or transfer of such technology to
the Houthi-Saleh forces.”61 The UN Panel of Experts
also confirmed the Houthis have been using drones
such as Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicles, similar “in
design, dimensions and capability” to the Iranianmade Ababil-T.62
In many instances, the Houthi way of war mirrors
Hezbollah’s strategy that emerged in the 1990s.
Contrary to Hamas, the Yemeni insurgents appear to
favor guerrilla tactics—however gruesome they may
be—over terrorist measures. Their political rhetoric
has not had the revolutionary undertones of Hamas or
Hezbollah from the early 1980s; they do not pretend
to annihilate Saudi Arabia or to spread a new political
model for the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Rather,
their main objective is to take full control of the state
of Yemen. Shortly after their takeover of the state
institutions, they issued a constitutional declaration
59. John Ismay and Helene Cooper, “US Accuses Iran of UN
Violation, but Evidence Falls Short,” New York Times, December
14, 2017.
60. Daniel Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, February 13, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/files
/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI
.pdf.
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Yemen, United Nations, January 26, 2018, 30.
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that was immediately rejected by most of the Arab
and Western countries.
The current logic of the Houthi missile warfare
campaign is to compel the Saudi-led coalition into
withdrawing its forces from the country. Although it
is doubtful that the Houthi combatants would be able
to regain parts of the Yemeni territory or fully control
it, they may find ways to maintain their grip on some
areas and try to force the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries into accepting a Houthi-controlled enclave
as a fait accompli. In this scenario, it is likely the group
would then turn its military strategy into one of A2/
AD.
To assess this possible development, we would
need to factor in the role of Iran and, more specifically,
the Revolutionary Guards. The latter has already
shored up its support to the Houthis since the war
started and in a context of regional proxy wars,
they could see an opportunity to enforce a Houthicontrolled A2/AD bubble by providing logistics and
military training. At the same time, Iran’s increased
support to the Houthis is an exercise in brinkmanship;
it enables the Yemeni insurgents to launch deadlier
attacks on the Saudi-led coalition and eventually
raises Western and Gulf pressures on Iran to cease it.
The Revolutionary Guards may believe low-intensity
proxy warfare in Yemen would not escalate into a
regional confrontation. But if a missile attack from
the Houthis killed a significant number of Saudi or
Emirati citizens, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would very
likely retaliate.
As a result, the major concern for Saudi Arabia,
and to a lesser extent the UAE, would be to see the
protracted conflict in Yemen evolving in such a way
that it leaves in place a security threat—a Houthi
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enclave defended by a vast arsenal—that would
increasingly look like the threat Hezbollah represents
to northern Israel. In other words, the missile threat
would become a fact of life for Gulf countries that
would require significant adaptation at the defensive
level. For Saudi Arabia, this circumstance has already
changed the framing of the issue, which initially was
one for commanders on the battlefield inside Yemen,
into a domestic concern for the authorities responsible
for the protection of their territory, infrastructure, and
citizens.
Finally, as this section discusses Middle East case
studies, one may wonder why a nonstate actor such as
the Islamic State (IS) is not covered. As IS took control
of military bases in Syria and Iraq, it had military
capabilities that could have enabled it to build a rather
strong A2/AD posture. But if we verify the two other
parameters, it seems clear the group was not leaning
toward this goal. First, at the political level, IS designed
a revolutionary agenda that denied the modern
international system and its Westphalian principles of
state sovereignty in the Middle East. It claimed instead
a return to the Caliphate era, an objective which
would almost frame Hezbollah’s call for a Lebanese
Islamic republic in the 1980s as a more realistic goal,
comparatively speaking. The Islamic State constantly
looked at its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq as part
of a broader momentum to conquer the entire Muslim
world. Its project was a self-contrived utopia based on
an eschatological vision: the belief in a final struggle
between Muslims and their enemies, the armies of
“Rome.”63 As a result, the military strategy of IS was
63. Jean-Loup Samaan, An End-of-Time Utopia: Understanding
the Narrative of the Islamic State (Rome: NATO Defense College,
April 2015).
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not one favoring any status quo. It favored guerilla
tactics in the territories it controlled and terrorist
campaigns in the countries opposing its rule. Given its
revolutionary agenda and the scale of the international
response it triggered, the IS experience can be seen
more as an exception than a possible pattern for other
armed militant groups. Ultimately, the reign of IS over
some territories in Syria and Iraq did not last, in part
because of this revolutionary posture, so militias may
logically look at the Hezbollah case as a more relevant
lesson on how to secure territorial gains.
In this perspective, Hamas and the Houthis
demonstrate the increased tendency of nonstate
groups in the Middle East to emulate state-inspired
strategies of A2/AD. In both cases, there are signs in
terms of political rhetoric, military capabilities, and
strategy that these groups may try to build such a
posture. Admittedly, these initiatives would be less
sophisticated than in the case of Hezbollah, given the
many limitations existing in terms of political agenda,
armament, and organizations.
As discussed in previous sections, this overview
does not suggest an automatic path toward nonstate
A2/AD postures. On the one hand, the leadership of
Hamas may have the capabilities in terms of rockets
required to build a rather credible defense of Gaza.
But the group remains ambivalent when it comes
to its inclination toward political status quo and
the rejection of terrorist tactics. On the other hand,
the strategy of the Houthis might transition more
effectively toward an A2/AD posture. For the last
few years, the frontlines have been rather static in the
ongoing conflict in Yemen, which could nurture the
belief among the insurgents that the preservation of
the status quo is achievable. Moreover, the Houthis’
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resorting to missile warfare echoes Hezbollah’s
practice from the 1990s. An A2/AD posture in this
case could imply stronger support from external
actors—namely, Iran and Hezbollah.
More broadly, this reminds us that although the
diffusion of military power to nonstate actors has
increased significantly in the last few decades, the
cases exposed here reveal how much militias have
to rely on external patronage to access sophisticated
weaponry and to conduct ambitious strategies. In
this sense, these nonstate A2/AD postures can be
understood as a by-product of proxy warfare. In the
next section, the example of Ukrainian separatists
reflects similar findings.
A2/AD BUBBLES IN UKRAINE’S CONTESTED
TERRITORIES
If the Middle East constitutes a revealing laboratory
of emerging nonstate military strategies, it is worth
looking at other regions of the world to assess whether
the trend toward A2/AD postures is identifiable
elsewhere. In this context, Eastern Europe, and more
specifically the Ukrainian theater with its secessionist
group tactics, resonates with the developments
covered in the previous sections. As in the Gaza Strip,
Yemen, and southern Lebanon, eastern Ukraine has
become a battlefield where state authorities have been
undermined and de facto replaced by local nonstate
organizations that have aimed to contest the control of
Kiev over these territories. As they toppled the regular
forces of the state, separatists pursued a politicalmilitary strategy consisting of changing the facts on
the ground and then forcing external actors to accept
the new state of affairs. To implement this strategy,
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Ukrainian separatists needed outside support—
namely, Russia. If Iranian support was undoubtedly
instrumental in the making of Hezbollah’s and
the Houthis’ current military strategy, the Russian
patronage of secessionist militias inside Ukraine was
even more decisive.
To understand how the situation in eastern Ukraine
unraveled, one needs to go back to 2014, when the
collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency in Kiev
triggered a national crisis that led to the Russian
annexation of Crimea. Leaning toward a closer
relation with Russia, Yanukovych had postponed
the conclusion of an agreement that would have
strengthened the ties between Kiev and the European
Union. The move was followed by the Euromaidan
protests and the ousting of Yanukovych in February
2014. A month later, Russian forces entered Crimea
following an illegal referendum on secession of the
region. Though Moscow argued its intervention was
driven by the need to protect the Russian population
in the area, it led to the de facto annexation of Crimea.64
Eastern and southern Ukraine started to unravel
as separatist movements saw the Russian takeover
of Crimea as evidence of potential Russian support
to their own aspirations. By April 2014, movements
calling themselves “people’s republics” burgeoned
in Donetsk, Kharkov, Luhansk, and Odessa.
Following the seizure of local state institutions by
these groups, a protracted war ensued between the
Ukrainian regular army and militiamen. Confronted
with repeat accusations of interference by Kiev and
Western countries, Moscow systematically denied its
64. Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The
Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2015).
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involvement. But various assessments have shown
these organizations were supported by the Russian
Federation and that Moscow provided economic,
logistic, and intelligence assistance.65 By March 2015,
it was estimated by the US Army Europe Commander,
Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, that there were
approximately 12,000 Russian troops in eastern
Ukraine backing up the separatists.66 The numbers
went down in the following months, and two years
later, the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pavlo
Klimkin, stated about 4,200 Russian troops were
still present.67 In addition, Russian citizens acting as
“volunteers” joined the ranks of the groups fighting
Ukraine’s armed forces.
The common denominator of these local conflicts
was the objective of separatists—and Russian forces—
to swiftly take control of the regions and their
institutions and then freeze the conflict to force the
government in Kiev and the international community
into accepting the fait accompli.68 For instance, the
Stanichno-Luhansk border guard division in Ukraine’s
Luhansk province was captured by rebels after five
65. “Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine,”
International Crisis Group, February 5, 2016, https://www
.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine
/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine.
66. “Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting
Rebels: US Commander,” Reuters, March 3, 2015, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-soldiers/some-12000
-russian-soldiers-in-ukraine-supporting-rebels-u-s-commander
-idUSKBN0LZ2FV20150303.
67. Hearing on Russian Policies and Intentions toward Specific
European Countries Before the Senate Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of
Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine).
68. Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in
Crimea and Donbas,” Parameters 46, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 14.
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days of fighting. This ultimately led to a stalemate with
the Ukrainian forces, which proved unable to regain
these territories. Eventually, separatists were able to
reach this prolonged deadlock because they received
Russian funding vital to their war effort. In 2016, the
nongovernmental organization International Crisis
Group estimated Moscow was directly bankrolling the
pensions, the social benefits, and the salaries of local
officials and military forces. The estimate concludes
the extent of this support was such that it could cost
the Russian treasury more than $1 billion annually to
sustain this situation.69
To achieve their political goals, Ukrainian separatist
groups needed credible military power to prevent
or defeat a Ukrainian offensive on their positions.
Therefore, they relied on capabilities similar to those
acquired by Middle East nonstate actors as illicit arms
flows dramatically increased following the start of the
conflict.70 There is limited knowledge with regard to
the military organization of these separatist groups
and the role they assign to missile warfare. But public
statements and tactics employed on the battlefield
provide significant information. Numerous incidents
have evidenced the use of rockets by the separatists.
On June 14, 2014, a Ukrainian military transport plane
was shot down as it was approaching its descent
into the eastern city of Luhansk. The following day,
the commander of the Luhansk People’s Republic
confirmed in a YouTube video that “the IL-76 was hit
by our militia, the air defense forces of the Luhansk
69.
“Ukraine: Military Deadlock, Political Crisis,”
International Crisis Group, December 19, 2016, https://www
.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine
/b85-ukraine-military-deadlock-political-crisis.
70. Anton Martyniuk, Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine
(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2017).
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People’s Republic.”71 Separatists claimed later that the
weapon used was an Igla-1 rocket launcher, a manportable air-defense system.72 Ukrainian authorities
have repeatedly reported cases of Russian-made
rockets being seized from separatists in the east of
the country. Weaponry that has been said to flow
between Russia and Ukrainian secessionist regions
includes small arms, armored personnel carriers,
tanks, and missile systems. These weapon supplies
have understandably stirred the controversy behind
the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17
in July 2014 that killed about 300 people. According
to Reuters, the attack was perpetrated by Ukrainian
separatists using BUK rockets provided by Russia—a
claim vigorously rejected by Moscow.73
In terms of force employment, statements are also
revealing. In an interview with Western journalists,
Alexander Gureyev, a militiaman from Luhansk,
described the systematic tactics of targeting Ukrainian
airplanes: “They simply flew above us, we were
already fed up with it all and decided that we would
start shooting at everything: we simply took anything
out of the sky that flew above us.”74 Just like the
Houthis in Yemen, the separatists in Ukraine have
used their weapons arsenal to prevent any incursion
71. Thomas Grove and Warren Strobel, “Special report:
Where Ukraine’s Separatists Get Their Weapons,” Reuters, July
29,
2014,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-arms
-specialreport/special-report-where-ukraines-separatists-get-their
-weapons-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729.
72. Grove and Strobel, “Special report.”
73. Toby Sterling and Anthony Deutsch, “Malaysian Flight
MH17 Downed by Russian-Made Missile: Prosecutors,” Reuters,
September 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine
-crisis-mh17/malaysian-flight-mh17-downed-by-russian-made-missile
-prosecutors-idUSKCN11Y0WN.
74. Sterling and Deutsch, “Malaysian Flight MH17.”
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from the regular Ukrainian forces and to consolidate
their territorial gains. Although they were able to seize
arms and munitions from the Ukrainian armed forces
after the state authorities collapsed in these regions, it
is likely they also received Russian military support.
Comparatively speaking, this Russian patronage was
more significant than the Iranian patronage in Yemen;
Russian forces both provided logistics and weaponry
and probably trained separatists to turn the seized
regions into sanctuaries. Events evidenced a strong
similarity between the separatists’ tactics and Russian
military culture—in particular, the implementation of
A2/AD bubbles.75
More broadly, the development in these Ukrainian
regions needs to be put into perspective with the
emergence of a Russian hybrid strategy. Although
this strategy has no official character, Western defense
analysts have speculated the Russian forces were
conducting campaigns with the intent to blur the
distinction between state and nonstate means. The
speculation grew in earnest following the publication
of an article written by Russia’s Chief of the General
Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, in February 2013 in
the newspaper Voenno-Promyshlenni Kurier (MilitaryIndustrial Courier). In the text, Gerasimov expounded
in great detail to speculate on the types of campaigns
that could be launched in a hybrid-strategy context,
such as “the use of special-operations forces and
internal opposition to create a permanently operating
front through the entire territory of the enemy state,
as well as informational actions.”76 The article logically
took on a prophetic dimension a year later when
75. Phillip Karber, Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian
War (Vienna, VA: Potomac Foundation, July 8, 2015).
76. Phillip Karber, Lessons Learned.
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Russia annexed Crimea. In particular, the appearance
of so-called “little green men” stirred a heated
discussion. These men, who were armed with Russian
equipment but wearing uniforms without insignia,
started occupying the international airport and the
parliament of Simferopol and soon deployed to the
military bases located in Crimea. Russian authorities
denied Western accusations that these soldiers were
actually Russian and called them “local self-defense
units.”77 The alleged use of the little green men
allowed Moscow to achieve its strategic objectives,
first in Crimea and later in the separatist regions,
while providing the Russian authorities with plausible
denial vis-à-vis the international community.78
Applying the three parameters of our nonstate
A2/AD model to the case of the Ukrainian separatists
enables us to see the similarities with the Middle
East examples. Politically, these groups have quickly
shifted their strategies from a revolutionary position,
prior to 2014, to a status quo mode today. In other
words, after challenging the boundaries of Ukrainian
sovereignty and changing the facts on the ground in
early 2014, the separatists then went on the defensive
and held their positions along the 500-km de facto
border acknowledged by the Minsk protocol of
September 2014.
This status quo orientation, however, did not
make these nonstate actors or quasi-states more stable
internally. In November 2017, a coup within the
Luhansk People’s Republic toppled Igor Plotnisky,
and the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic,
77. Steven Pifer, “Watch Out for Little Green Men,” Der
Spiegel, July 7, 2014.
78. Andras Racz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine (Helsinki:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 11.
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Alexander Zakharchenko, was killed in August
2018.79 These were two cases among a dozen of other
assassinations and coups that have happened in these
regions since 2014. These events did not change the
military positions on both sides, but indicated the
fragility of these Russian-backed entities.80 Corruption,
arbitrary detention, extortion, and major deficiencies
in the delivery of basic services to the local population
have prevented these players from being considered
more than Russian proxies. This may be the most
significant difference with the organizations covered
in the previous sections: eastern Ukraine is more
dependent on Moscow’s patronage than Hezbollah,
Hamas, or the Houthis are on Iran’s. The selfproclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk
People’s Republic were set up in the context of the
momentum brought about by the annexation of
Crimea. They were in many ways a mere by-product
of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine. In contrast, Hamas,
the Houthis, and Hezbollah built platforms in
the Palestinian territories, Yemen, and Lebanon,
respectively, that had a grassroots dimension and
enabled the nonstate actors to mobilize support from
a constituency. It is very likely in the case of the
separatists of eastern Ukraine that their grip on the
contested regions would collapse if Russia were to
change its broader strategy vis-à-vis Kiev and Western
countries. Some observers have even defended the
theory that the killing of separatist leaders could
be orchestrated by Russian services themselves to
79. Mansur Mirovalev, “Russia-Backed Separatists in
Ukraine in Disarray amid Infighting and Violence,” Los Angeles
Times, October 1, 2018.
80. Maxim Vikhrov, “The Luhansk Coup: Why Armed
Conflict Erupted in Russia’s Puppet Regime,” Carnegie Moscow
Center, November 29, 2017, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/74864.
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maintain their control of the regions in preparation for
a trade-off with Western countries.81 In this context,
the Ukrainian case underlines the importance of states
in the growth of these nonstate A2/AD bubbles. It
is only because of Russian proxy tactics that these
separatist movements were effective in defeating the
Ukrainian regular forces. This lesson also echoes the
role of Iran in the growth of Hezbollah, Hamas, and
the Houthi insurgents in this domain, though on a
different scale. More broadly, the lesson calls for a
new understanding of the interaction between states
and nonstate actors on the battlefield, especially in the
context of emerging A2/AD strategies.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
As demonstrated by the cases presented in this
monograph, nonstate actors today have the ability
to build nascent A2/AD strategies. The exponential
progress in missile technologies, the expansion of
proliferation networks, and the capacity of armed
groups to assemble their own indigenous arsenals
are trends that altogether change the security
environment in regions such as the Middle East and
Eastern Europe. Three intertwined parameters can
help us identify a change in the military orientation of
these nonstate organizations: a political shift toward
the preservation of the status quo vis-à-vis opponents;
a significant focus of military resources dedicated to
A2/AD capabilities—primarily, missiles and rockets;
and, finally, a consequential adaptation of the military
units responsible for the implementation of this new
strategy.
81. Mirovalev, “Russia-Backed Separatists.”
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These postures, however, are still in their infancy,
and should not be equated with those of major
regional or world powers such as Iran, Russia, or
China. The development of nonstate A2/AD postures
currently remains dependent on the ability of the
nonstate actors to attract state sponsorship. Hezbollah
was able to acquire its arsenal because of its support
from Iran and Syria. The Houthis could not sustain
their ongoing missile campaign against Saudi Arabia
without significant help from Tehran. Likewise, the
Ukrainian separatists only became a credible threat to
Kiev thanks to the provision of military resources by
Russia.
This context means that without state sponsorship,
these emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies would
hardly constitute a major challenge. Although
rudimentary weapons such as short-range rockets
are easily accessible to militias, they would not cause
enough damage to raise the costs of an opponent’s
retaliation to a threshold of deterrence. Eventually,
all successful cases discussed in this monograph have
involved state support. In other words, only if states
such as Iran or Russia decide to spread their military
technologies and strategies to regional proxies can the
nonstate A2/AD phenomenon become a conceivable
model.
Bearing in mind this precondition, if a scenario of
multiple nonstate A2/AD bubbles were to unfold, the
United States and its allies could face unprecedented
challenges, especially in the field of counterterrorism
campaigns. For military planners considering scenarios
in Europe and the Middle East, such a scenario would
create new constraints to factor in when assessing the
option of using military force in regional interventions.
It may raise the level of potential casualties, and
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eventually, it could constitute a kind of life insurance
for those terrorist organizations.
This trend could also have major implications for the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nonstate
A2/AD strategies on the southern flank of Europe
would pose various types of threats for populations,
commercial ships crossing the Mediterranean Sea,
and NATO troops if they were to operate in the area.
The lasting collapse of Libyan central authorities and
the enduring security vacuum in the Sinai Peninsula
would fuel proliferation networks on the North
African shores of the Mediterranean. In these areas,
militias could then contemplate the implementation of
a Hezbollah model and as a result target civilian ships
as an effective way of gaining political influence.82
NATO should also consider the consequences of
the Hezbollah model for its future operations in the
Middle East region. Militias’ increased access to rockets
and missiles and their use as a way to deny foreign
forces access to their strongholds could significantly
complicate NATO interventions on its southern flank.
Missions such as enforcing no-fly zones over an area
could be challenged by the increased vulnerability
of naval and air assets, which would be targeted by
these arsenals. This would therefore raise the potential
human cost of operations—and, by extension, the
political cost. In other words, could a new intervention
such as Operation Unified Protector in Libya be
82. Jean-Loup Samaan, “The Missile Threat in the
Mediterranean: Implications for European Security,” Real
Instituto Elcano, October 25, 2017, http://www.realinstitutoelcano
.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL
_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/defensa+y+seguridad/ari79
-2017-samaan-missile-threat-mediterranean-implications-european
-security.
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launched if NATO were facing potential resistance
from a group such as Hezbollah?
The evolution of these nonstate strategies has
immediate consequences for regional partners that the
US government aims to strengthen. In countries with
weak central authority, such as Lebanon, Ukraine, and
Yemen, nonstate A2/AD strategies serve a strategy
of fait accompli that forces governments to accept
the status quo with separatist or terrorist entities.
Because of the sophistication of these strategies and
the operational limitations of regular armed forces in
the countries mentioned, the current situation makes
it extremely difficult to dislodge these groups.
In this context, the first priority should be to
strengthen the situational awareness of the United
States and its allies. Our understanding of the ways
in which missile proliferation is changing the strategic
behavior of extremist groups is incomplete and
should be enhanced via intelligence cooperation and
military research. For instance, a comprehensive look
at nonstate actors, including those in other regions,
such as the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia, could
enable us to refine the analytical parameters and build
a more robust framework for assessment. Eventually,
this information would allow military planners to
appraise the extent to which asymmetric capabilities
such as rockets and missiles are impacting the military
structure of these organizations. Likewise, planners
could evaluate whether these inventories should be
considered as means of deterrence or coercion—or,
alternatively, as bargaining chips to accumulate power
on the ground or instruments of terror for attacks on
civilian targets.
At the same time, the challenge of nonstate
A2/AD strategies is another factor calling for the
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reinforcement of local state capabilities. Enhancing
the ability of regional partners to monitor the flow of
arsenals means more resources and training dedicated
to both conventional armed forces, coast guards, and
police forces, which play a crucial role in the early
phase in curbing the flows of armaments.
Finally, these developments stress the need for a
broader discussion on the redefinition of deterrence
vis-à-vis nonstate actors. This recommendation is
likely to provoke a controversy as it implies accepting
the conditions of the status quo as established by these
groups. Deterring them today would not inevitably
mean deterring them (and accepting them) forever.
The United States and its allies could consider
accepting a temporary standoff, which would not
remove the threat, but would at least contain it while
the measures that could erode the military power of
these organizations are identified. This effort would,
perhaps, involve intelligence operations and sanctions
targeting specific financial assets or the state patronage
of countries such as Russia and Iran.
All in all, the phenomenon of nonstate A2/AD
strategies should be of concern for both scholars
and practitioners as it broadens the array of
strategic options for militias and other insurgents. It
redefines the fault lines between conventional and
nonconventional strategies—in particular, in the
context of proxy warfare. Finally, it forces us to review
future military scenarios involving the US armed
forces and their allies.
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NONSTATE ACTORS AND ANTI-ACCESS/
AREA DENIAL STRATEGIES: THE COMING
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